OF ROCKS AND HARD PLACES: OPTING FOR ARBITRARINESS OR
SPECULATION IN THE BUILT-IN CAPITAL GAINS TAX DISCOUNT
IN THE VALUATION OF CLOSELY HELD BUSINESSES FOR ESTATE
AND GIFT TAX PURPOSES
BRENT B. NICHOLSON∗
INTRODUCTION
Since the repeal of the General Utilities doctrine1 in the Tax Reform Act of
1986 , an issue has been festering concerning estate and gift tax valuations of closely
held stock.3 The Treasury Regulations (“Regulations”) require that assets be valued
at fair market value determined by the price that a hypothetical buyer and seller
would agree upon as of the date of death (or date of the gift)4. The issue addressed
in this article is whether the taxpayer is allowed to discount that fair market value by
some or the entire amount of the capital gains tax that would theoretically be payable
upon liquidation or distribution of the business’s appreciated assets (often referred to
as “built-in gains”).
2

The Internal Revenue Service (“IRS” or “Service”) and the Tax Court
initially determined that such a discount was not permitted because the amount of
the tax was too speculative.5 However, after contrary holdings by the Second, Fifth,
∗
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The General Utilities doctrine, which allowed a corporation to liquidate its assets and pass the
proceeds to its shareholders without the corporation being taxed on the gains, originated from General
Utilities & Operating Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200 (1935). See infra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
1

2 Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 631, 100 Stat. 2085 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).

Estate and gift taxes are based on cumulative lifetime transfers and property owned (as defined by
the Internal Revenue Code) at the date of death. Graduated rates are applied based on the total
amount of estate property and lifetime transfers less exempt transfers and amounts. See I.R.C. §§
2001, 2502 (2006).
3

4 Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b) (as amended in 1965) (estate tax valuation); Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-1 (as
amended in 1992) (gift tax valuation).
5 See, e.g., Estate of Luton v. Comm’r, 68 T.C.M. (CCH) 1044 (1994); Estate of Bennett v. Comm’r, 65
T.C.M. (CCH) 1816 (1993); Ward v. Comm’r, 87 T.C. 78 (1986); Estate of Andrews v. Comm’r, 79
T.C. 938 (1982); Estate of Piper v. Comm’r, 72 T.C. 1062 (1979); Estate of Cruikshank v. Comm’r, 9
T.C. 162 (1947). In a Technical Advice Memorandum, the Service advised that while the General
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and Sixth Circuits, a discount is now permissible even absent a showing that
liquidation is likely.6 The focus of the courts has largely shifted to the amount of the
discount. The Second and Sixth Circuits have not definitively established whether a
full discount is allowable, but have hinted that something less than the full amount of
the tax is more appropriate.7 The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, however, have now
held that a full discount is proper.8 In June 2008, the Commissioner of the IRS
petitioned the United States Supreme Court to review the Eleventh Circuit’s decision
in Commissioner v. Estate of Jelke.9 The Supreme Court denied certiorari on October 6,
2008.10
This article will examine the most important decisions leading up to Jelke,
provide a thorough examination of the Jelke appellate court decision, and end with an
analysis of what the most appropriate valuation method should be. Many hoped that
the Supreme Court would hear the Jelke case and resolve the issue so that valuations
could be conducted on a more consistent basis across the country.11 That hope,
however, was not realized.
I. THE STATUTORY AND REGULATORY PROVISIONS
This discussion begins with an examination of the Internal Revenue Code
(the “Code”). Under § 2031 of the Code, the federal estate tax encompasses all
property of a decedent as valued at time of death, valued as of the time of death.12
Utilities doctrine was one reason for disallowing the tax discount, the primary reason was the
“speculative nature of the liquidation itself.” The abrogation of General Utilities by the Tax Reform
Act of 1986 thus had no affect on the disallowance of the discount. No liquidation was contemplated
under the facts of the Memorandum, so no discount was allowed. I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 91-50-001
(Aug. 20, 1991).
6

See discussion infra Part II.B-C, E regarding the Eisenberg, Welch, and Dunn cases.

7

See discussion infra Part II.B-C regarding the Eisenberg and Welch cases.

8

See discussion infra Part II.E and Part III regarding the Dunn and Jelke cases.

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Comm’r v. Estate of Jelke, 2008 WL 2472932 (June 19, 2008) (No.
07-1582).
9

10

Comm’r v. Estate of Jelke, 129 S. Ct. 168 (2008).

11 Issues regarding discounts for lack of control and lack of marketability are often involved in cases
concerning discounts for potential capital gains tax liability, but those discounts are beyond the scope
of this article.
12 Section 2031 provides: “The value of the gross estate of the decedent shall be determined by
including to the extent provided for in this part, the value at the time of his death of all property, real
or personal, tangible or intangible, wherever situated.” I.R.C. § 2031(a) (2006).
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That description is somewhat refined by § 2033 of the Code, which provides that the
gross estate includes the decedent’s property owned at death, “to the extent of the
interest therein.”13 This generally includes the decedent’s probate assets.14
The Code provisions are clarified in the Regulations—particularly in sections
20.2031-2 and 20.2031-3. Section 20.2031-3 of the Regulations specifies that the fair
market value of a decedent’s interest in a business is the “net” amount that a willing
purchaser and a willing seller would agree upon, presuming that the transaction was
voluntary and informed.15 The value is to be based upon, among other things, an
appraisal of the business’s assets, earning capacity, and “other factors” listed in
section 20.2031-2(f) of the Regulations.16 These other factors include goodwill,
economic outlook, industry position, degree of control, and values of similar
businesses listed on an exchange.17 Section 20.2031-2 of the Regulations generally
discusses the valuation of stocks and bonds.18 Section 20.2031-2(f) specifically
discusses the valuation of stock where comparable prices are not available. This
would typically be a situation involving closely held business interests. In such cases,
consideration includes “net worth, prospective earning power and dividend paying
capacity, and other relevant factors.”19 In addition to these factors, non-operating
assets merit consideration in the valuation determination to the extent not otherwise
considered.20
Revenue Ruling 59-60 is of additional significance to the statutory and
regulatory posture of the capital gains tax deduction analysis.21 The Ruling, which
was originally promulgated in January, 1959, provides guidance in the valuation of

I.R.C. § 2033 (“The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all property to the extent of
the interest therein of the decedent at the time of his death.”).

13

14

Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(a)(1) (as amended in 1965).

15

Id. § 20.2031-3 (as amended in 1992).

16

Id. § 20.2031-3(a)-(c).

17 Id. § 20.2031-2(f)(2). The weight to be accorded these factors is based on the facts and
circumstances of the particular case. Id.
18

Id. § 20.2031-2.

19

Id.

20

Id.

21 Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 C.B. 237 (amplified in Rev. Rul. 77-287, 1977-2 C.B. 319, Rev. Rul. 80-214,
1980-2 C.B. 171, and Rev. Rul. 83-120, 1983-2 C.B. 170) (modified in Rev. Rul. 65-193, 1965-2 C.B.
370).
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stock of closely held businesses for estate and gift tax purposes.22 The Ruling
recognizes that valuation of such interests is not exact but rather calls on judgment,
common sense, and reasonableness. The Ruling also identifies and discusses eight
factors to be considered.23 In particular, in discussing book value and financial
condition, the Ruling says that non-operating assets, including securities and real
estate investments, should be included.24 Investment assets are to be considered at
market, rather than book, value.25
The Ruling also discusses the weight to be accorded the various factors. In
operating businesses, earning capacity should take precedence.26 For investment
companies, asset value is primary.27 In fact, the Ruling states that net asset value
should be accorded greater weight in valuing real estate or investment companies
than earnings or dividend-paying capacity.28
II. THE CASE LAW BACKGROUND
The discussion of whether and how much to deduct from the value of a
closely held business for the amount attributable to the contingent tax on capital
gains residing in such business dates back to the 1935 case General Utilities &
Id. § 1. A closely held business is one in which there are a relatively small number of owners and no
ready market for the sale of an ownership interest. Id. at § 2.03.
22

The factors, not exclusive of others, are considered “fundamental” and are as follows: “the nature
of the business and the history of the enterprise since its inception,” “the economic outlook in general
and the condition and outlook of the specific industry in particular,” “the book value of the stock and
the financial condition of the business,” “the earning capacity of the company,” “the dividend paying
capacity,” “whether or not the enterprise has goodwill or other intangible value,” “sales of the stock
and the size of the block of stock to be valued,” and “the market price of stocks of corporations
engaged in the same or a similar line of business having their stocks actively traded in a free and open
market, either on an exchange or over-the-counter.” Id. § 4.01(a)-(h).
23

24

Id. § 4.02(c).

25

Id.

26

Id. § 5(a).

27

Id.

“For companies of this type, the appraiser should determine the fair market values of the assets of
the company. Operating expenses of such a company and the cost of liquidating it, if any, merit
consideration when appraising the relative values of the stock and the underlying assets . . . adjusted
net worth should be accorded greater weight in valuing the stock of a closely held investment or real
estate holding company, whether or not family owned, than any other customary yardsticks of
appraisal, such as earnings or dividend paying capacity.” Id. § 5(b) (emphasis added). The taxes
payable on liquidation could be considered part of the cost of liquidation.
28
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Operating Co. v. Helvering.29 In General Utilities, the United States Supreme Court held
that there was no entity level tax on a distribution of appreciated property to
shareholders, creating the so-called “General Utilities doctrine.”30 The doctrine was
codified in I.R.C. §§ 311(a), 336 and 337.31 In 1986, as part of the Tax Reform Act
of 1986, Congress eliminated the General Utilities doctrine from the Code.32 Section
336 now states that a corporation should treat a liquidating distribution of property
to shareholders as a sale.33 Section 311(b) now also provides that if a company
distributes property which has a fair market value in excess of the company’s basis in
that property, the company must treat the transaction as a sale even if it is not in
complete liquidation.34 The recipient of such a distribution in complete liquidation is
treated as having received payment in full in exchange for their stock (i.e., capital
gain taxation).35 The 1986 change to §§ 311 and 336 created the issue of whether the
potential corporate level capital gains tax should be deducted in computing the value
of the closely held business for estate and gift tax purposes and, if so, the proper
amount of that deduction. Several cases preceding Jelke considered the issue, but the
holdings of those cases were inconsistent and resulted in circuit splits. This
discussion now turns to the most prominent cases preceding the Jelke decision.

29

General Utilities & Operating Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200 (1935).

30

Id. at 206.

Section 311(a) formerly provided that “no gain or loss shall be recognized to a corporation on the
distribution, with respect to its stock, of 1) its stock (or rights to acquire its stock), or 2) property.”
I.R.C. § 311(a) (1954) (amended 1986). Section 336 formerly provided that “no gain or loss shall be
recognized to a corporation on the distribution of property in partial or complete liquidation.” Id. §
336. Section 337 formerly provided that if a corporation distributed all its assets in complete
liquidation within twelve months of adoption of a plan of liquidation, no gain or loss would be
recognized by the corporation. Id. § 337.

31

Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 631, 100 Stat. 2085 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
32

I.R.C. § 336(a) now provides that “gain or loss shall be recognized to a liquidating corporation on
the distribution of property in complete liquidation as if such property were sold to the distributee at
fair market value.” I.R.C. § 336(a) (2006). Section 337 now provides for non-recognition of gain or
loss on distributions by an 80% owned subsidiary to its parent in complete liquidation. Id. § 337(a).
33

Id. § 311(b)(1). Section 311(a) now states that no gain or loss is recognized to a corporation on a
distribution not in complete liquidation of its stock or property except as provided in subsection (b).
Id. § 311(a) (emphasis added).

34

35 Id. § 331(a). Generally, if a distribution of property is not in complete liquidation, a shareholder will
have dividend income to the extent of current and accumulated earnings and profits, no income (to
the extent of their basis in the stock), and then capital gain income for any remaining amount of the
distribution. Id. § 301(a)-(c).
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A. Davis v. Commissioner
The decedent in Davis v. Commissioner died as the beneficiary of a trust that
owned all the stock of a closely held corporation.36 That corporation held various
assets, including 1.328% of the outstanding common stock of Winn-Dixie Stores,
Inc. 37 The Winn-Dixie stock alone was valued at $70 million.38 Prior to the
decedent’s death, he gifted approximately 25% of the holding company’s stock to
each of his two sons.39 These gifts were valued for gift tax purposes at
approximately $7.5 million per gift.40 The IRS contested the value, alleging it was
approximately $12 million per block.41 Sales of Winn-Dixie stock by the decedent,
the holding company, and the trust were restricted under Securities and Exchange
Commission Rule 144.42 The issues in the case were the amount of any discounts for
the minority positions of the blocks, their lack of marketability, and the sizable
capital gains tax residing in the holding company if the Winn-Dixie stock, in
particular, were to be liquidated.43
The IRS took the position that no built-in gains tax discount should be
employed in the case because there was no planned or contemplated liquidation of
the business.44 Indeed, prior to this case, the Tax Court had held that no such

36

Davis v. Comm’r, 110 T.C. 530, 531-32 (1998).

Id. The Davis case (and the Eisenberg case, discussed below) involved valuation issues in the gift tax
(not estate tax) context. Because the federal estate and gift tax systems are “unified,” the valuation
issues for gift tax purposes are the same as those for estate tax, except for the date on which the
valuation is made—the date of the gift for gift tax and date of death for the estate tax. The valuation
regulations for gift tax mirror those of the estate tax.

37

38

Id. at 533.

39

Id. at 531.

40

Id. at 534.

41

Id.

42 Id. at 532. Rule 144 restricts the timing and amount of resales of closely held stock issued pursuant
to a federal securities law registration exemption. It is, therefore, an impediment to the marketability
of such stock, which reduces its fair market value. See 17 C.F.R. 230.144 (2008).
43 See Davis, 110 T.C. at 530. The basis of all the Winn-Dixie stock in the holding company was about
$338,000, for a gain of approximately $69.6 million as of the valuation date. The total capital gains tax
at the time would have been nearly $26 million. Id. at 533-34.
44 Id. at 547. The petitioner had stipulated that there was no planned or contemplated liquidation of
the business. Id.
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discount should be accorded where liquidation was not planned or was speculative.45
Here, however, the Tax Court changed course.
In consideration of the Commissioner’s concession that if liquidation did
occur or if avoidance of the tax was not accomplished by conversion to an S
corporation, a substantial tax would be due, the court held that some reduction in
value was appropriate.46 After parsing through various expert valuations, the court
held that even though no liquidation was contemplated, hypothetical buyers and
sellers of the stock would have considered the effect of the tax in determining a
price.47 The IRS’s position was likely undermined by its own expert, who had
included some discount for the tax effect as part of the marketability discount.48 The
court distinguished the cases relied upon by the IRS as either predating the repeal of
the General Utilities doctrine in 1986 or as cases where the taxpayer sought a 100%
reduction for the capital gains tax.49 That argument had been rejected in these cases
because there was no contemplated liquidation.50 In its holding, the Davis court
granted a discount for some, but less than a full, built-in gains tax effect, but
incorporated it as part of the discount for a lack of marketability.51 Thus, the Davis
case marked a breakthrough in the Tax Court’s treatment of the discount.52

Id. at 546-47 (citing Estate of Luton v. Comm’r, 68 T.C.M. (CCH) 1044 (1994); Estate of Bennett v.
Comm’r, 65 T.C.M. (CCH) 1816 (1993); Ward v. Comm’r, 87 T.C. 78 (1986); Estate of Andrews v.
Comm’r, 79 T.C. 938 (1982); Estate of Piper v. Comm’r, 72 T.C. 1062 (1979); Estate of Cruikshank v.
Comm’r, 9 T.C. 162 (1947); Messing v. Comm’r, 48 T.C. 502 (1967); Mandelbaum v. Comm’r, 69
T.C.M (CCH) 2852 (1995); Estate of Ford v. Comm’r, 66 T.C.M. (CCH) 1507 (1993)).

45

46 Id. at 547-48. Conversion to an S Corporation is generally unattractive because assets must be held
for ten years to avoid taxation on the built-in gains. See I.R.C. § 1374(a), (d)(7) (2006).
47

Davis, 110 T.C. at 550.

48

Id. at 552.

Id. at 551-52. As previously discussed, no tax would have been due under the General Utilities
doctrine. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.

49

50 As to the taxpayer’s claim for a full reduction for the amount of the tax, the court stated that since
no sale of assets was contemplated, the full amount of the tax could not be used as a discount. Some
discount, however, was appropriate because complete avoidance of the tax was unlikely and would
therefore affect the amount a willing buyer would pay. Davis, 110 T.C. at 552-53.

Id. at 553. The total tax was approximately $26.7 million. The court took the net asset value of the
company, applied a 15% minority discount, and adjusted for a lack of marketability, totaling $29
million. Of the $29 million, $9 million was attributable to the built-in gain tax.
51

The $9 million was between the amounts calculated by the experts for both sides (one of taxpayer’s
experts computed a full tax discount, the other taxpayer expert and the IRS’s expert computed a
partial tax discount). The Tax Court did not allow any discount for the Rule 144 resale restrictions
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B. Eisenberg v. Commissioner
Two months after the Davis decision, the Second Circuit weighed in on the
debate in Eisenberg v. Commissioner.53 In Eisenberg, which (like Davis) involved a
valuation issue with respect to the gift tax, the Second Circuit took a more aggressive
position on the existence and amount of the tax discount. The Eisenberg case
involved an appeal of a grant of summary judgment by the Tax Court, which had
rejected a taxpayer’s claimed discount for the full amount of built-in gains tax that
would have been owed had the taxpayer’s wholly-owned corporation liquidated or
distributed its sole asset.54
That sole asset of the C-corporation was a commercial building which it
leased to others.55. Over three years, the taxpayer gifted stock in the corporation to
her child and grandchildren.56 The value of the building was determined each year,
and each year the value was reduced by the full amount of the capital gains tax that
would have been assessed.57 Eisenberg conceded that there were no plans to sell or
distribute the building.58 Over the three years, the IRS claimed gift tax deficiencies
that totaled almost $62,000—all attributable to the claimed tax effect discount.59 The
sole issue considered by the Second Circuit was the appropriateness of the tax
discount.60
In granting the IRS’s motion for summary judgment, the Tax Court had
relied on the line of cases established before the repeal of the General Utilities
because the taxpayer had not satisfied his burden of proof that he was entitled to such a discount, nor
its amount. Id. at 544.
The Tax Court stated its new view: “[I]n determining the fair market value on the valuation date of
each of the blocks of stock at issue, it is necessary to apply a discount or adjustment attributable to . . .
built-in capital gains tax because that is what a hypothetical willing seller and hypothetical willing
buyer would have done under the facts and circumstances existing on that date.” Id. at 552.
52

53

Eisenberg v. Comm’r, 155 F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 1998).

54

Eisenberg v. Comm’r, 74 T.C.M. (CCH) 1046 (1997).

55

Eisenberg, 155 F.3d at 51.

56

Id. at 52.

57

Id.

58

Id.

59

Id.

60Id.

All other issues in the case were stipulated by the parties. Id. at 52.
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doctrine, which held that no such discount was permitted.61 These holdings were
correct under General Utilities and the pre-1986 Code because there was no tax at the
corporate level on a distribution of appreciated property. On appeal, the Second
Circuit considered whether, given the 1986 amendments to the Code, a tax discount
should be allowed where there was no plan to sell or distribute corporate assets.62
The taxpayer argued that the hypothetical buyer and seller would undoubtedly reduce
the corporation’s value by the amount of that tax liability.63 The IRS argued that no
such tax would be incurred if a buyer bought the company stock and continued
leasing the building and, given that there were no plans to sell or distribute the
building, any estimate of the amount would be unduly speculative.64
The Second Circuit sided with the taxpayer. First, like the Tax Court in
Davis, the panel rejected the precedential value of the cases occurring before the
repeal of General Utilities.65 Second, the court emphasized that in determining fair
market value based on a hypothetical buyer and seller, it was a hypothetical buyer and
seller—not actual ones—who should be considered.66 According to the court, it was
not speculative that a hypothetical buyer would demand a discount for the
unavoidable capital gains tax.67 Further, that potential tax liability would have a
depressing effect on the fair market value of the property, and the fair market value
of the property was what was ultimately being sought.68 The court cited Davis in
support of its holding.69
Notably, the Second Circuit left open the issue of the amount of the
discount. In a footnote, the court stated:
61 The Tax Court relied on Ward v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 78 (1986), Estate of Andrews v. Commissioner, 79
T.C. 938 (1982), Estate of Piper v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 1062 (1979), and Estate of Cruikshank v.
Commissioner, 9 T.C. 162 (1947). Id. at 54. The Tax Court also cited Gallun v. Commissioner, 33 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1316 (1974) as a General Utilities era case supporting the idea that if there were no immediate
plans to liquidate, a capital gains tax discount was too speculative. Id. at 57.
62

Id. at 55-56.

63

Id. at 56.

64

Id.

65

Id. at 57.

66

Id. (quoting Curry v. United States, 706 F.2d 1424, 1428-29 (7th Cir. 1983).

67 Id. at 57 (noting that it is indisputable that a hypothetical buyer would demand some discount in
price because of the inability to avoid the tax liability).
68

Id.

69

Id. at 58.
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One might conclude from this example that the full amount of the
capital gains tax should be subtracted from what would otherwise be
the fair market value of the real estate. This would not be a correct
conclusion. In this case we are only addressing how potential tax
consequences . . . may affect the fair market value of the shares of
stock appellant gifted to her relatives in contrast to the fair market
value of the real estate.70
The case was then remanded to the Tax Court for a determination of the gift tax
deficiency. The Commissioner later acquiesced to the Second Circuit decision.71
C. Estate of Welch v. Commissioner
In Estate of Welch v. Commissioner, an unpublished decision rendered in early
2000, the Sixth Circuit overturned a Tax Court ruling that denied an estate tax
valuation discount for potential capital gains tax liability.72 According to the Tax
Court, the potential for a § 1033 election made the possibility of such a tax too
speculative to grant a discount.73 On appeal, the IRS conceded that some discount
was permissible but argued that the taxpayer had failed to prove the appropriate
amount.74
First, the Sixth Circuit found that the potential availability of the § 1033
election would be a consideration of a hypothetical buyer. The court held, however,

70

Id. at 58 n.15 (emphasis added).

71 Eisenberg v. Comm’r, 155 F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 1998), action on dec., 1999-01 (Jan. 28, 1999). In its
Action on Decision, the IRS stated, “We acquiesce in the opinion to the extent that it holds that there
is no legal prohibition against such a discount. The applicability of such a discount, as well as the
amount, will hereafter be treated as factual matters to be determined by competent expert testimony
based on the circumstances of each case and generally applicable valuation principles.” Id.
72

Estate of Welch v. Comm’r, No. 98-2007, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 3315 (6th Cir. Mar 1, 2000).

73 Section 1033 generally provides that no gain is recognized on the involuntary conversion of
property if the property is converted to a similar or related use or if non-similar property or money is
received and is used to replace the converted property within two years, except to the extent any
amount received on conversion exceeds the basis in the property converted, assuming the taxpayer
makes a timely election to do so. I.R.C. § 1033(a)(1)-(2) (2006).
74

Welch, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 3315, at *6.
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that such a consideration did not automatically negate a capital gains tax discount.75
Thus, the Sixth Circuit reversed the Tax Court’s holding.76
The Sixth Circuit remanded the case to the Tax Court for a determination of
the proper amount of the discount.77 In its remand, the Sixth Circuit stated that
“petitioners may not be entitled to deduct the full amount of that liability . . . .”78
Thus, the court left open the issue of whether a discount of the full amount of the
tax liability was possible.
D. Estate of Jameson v. Commissioner
In Estate of Jameson v. Commissioner, a decedent’s estate contained 80,485 shares
of stock in a holding company. 79 The IRS had assessed a deficiency in the
decedent’s estate tax based on an alleged undervaluation of the holding company
stock. 80 The Tax Court agreed, although its valuation differed from that of the
Service.81 The estate appealed, contending (among other things) that it was entitled
to a full discount for the capital gains tax liability attributable to certain appreciated
property residing in the holding company.82 The Fifth Circuit overturned the Tax
Court’s valuation and its method of discounting the capital gains tax liability.83
The holding company owned 5,405 acres of timber property, which it
licensed to others in return for a fee.84 These fees accounted for about 80% of the
holding company’s revenue.85 The property itself was worth $6 million at the time of

75

Id. at *14-15.

Id. at *16 (“The error of the Tax Court was holding, as a matter of law, that the availability of a
§ 1033 election prevented any discount in the value of the corporation’s stock.”).

76

77

Id. at *17.

78

Id. at *20 (emphasis added).

79

Estate of Jameson v. Comm’r, 267 F.3d 366, 367 (5th Cir. 2001).

80 See generally Estate of Jameson v. Comm’r, 77 T.C.M. (CCH) 1383 (1999), 1999 Tax Ct. Memo
LEXIS 42.
81

See generally id.

82

Jameson, 267 F.3d at 371.

83

Id. at 375.

84

Id. at 368.

85

Id.
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the decedent’s death.86 Another piece of real estate the company owned was worth
$240,000.87 The company’s bases in the properties were $217,850 and $110,740,
respectively, which would have resulted in a $5.9 million gain if the property were
sold or distributed.88 The dispute in this aspect of the case concerned whether and
to what extent a discount for potential capital gains tax liability should be factored
into the estate tax valuation.89 The Tax Court allowed no discount for the less
valuable property because the parties had not presented evidence on the issue.90 It
permitted a built-in gains tax discount on the timber property but “discounted the
discount” to reflect a presumption that the timber property would not be liquidated
immediately but over time.91
The Fifth Circuit rejected the Tax Court’s approach.92 The Fifth Circuit held
that the Tax Court erred because it had assumed a “strategic” or actual buyer of
Johnco rather than the required “hypothetical” buyer.93 According to the circuit
court, a hypothetical buyer would act in the most economically rational way and
liquidate the property because the return available for continued operation was
below that which a buyer would demand.94 This computation invalidated the Tax
86

Id.

87

Id. at 369.

88

Id. at 368-69.

89

Id. at 371.

Jameson, 77 T.C.M. (CCH) 1383, 1999 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 42, at *59 n.27. On appeal, the Fifth
Circuit also directed the Tax Court to apply a tax discount with respect to this property. Jameson, 267
F.3d at 373-74.
90

Jameson, 77 T.C.M. (CCH) 1383, 1999 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 42, at *57. The Tax Court first said
that Johnco would realize gains on the sale of its timber pursuant to its election under IRC § 631(a).
Id. A § 631(a) election treats the cutting of timber as a deemed sale, and the cut timber acquires the
value at the time of cutting as the tax basis when it is then sold, which is then ordinary income. I.R.C.
§ 631(a) (2006). Gain was thus unavoidable even if there were no liquidation of the company. The
court determined that it would take nine years to fully recognize the built-in gains and utilized a 20%
discount rate to determine the present value of the capital gains tax. Jameson, 77 T.C.M. (CCH) 1383,
1999 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 42, at *58-59. This approach was also utilized by the Tax Court in the
post-Davis, post-Eisenberg, post-Welch, and post-Jameson decisions of Estate of Dailey v. Commissioner, 82
T.C.M. (CCH) 90, at 7-8 (2001) (merely accepting taxpayer’s expert’s inclusion of an amount for builtin gain taxes in the marketability discount without comment), and Borgatello v. Commissioner, T.C.M.
(RIA) 54013, at 33-36 (2000).
91

92

Jameson, 267 F.3d 366 at 371-72.

93

Id. at 371.

94 Id. at 372 (“The hypothetical willing buyer/willing seller test substitutes evidence of the actual
owner’s or purchaser’s intent with the most economically rational analysis of a sale.”). The projected
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Court’s valuation, which had been based on continued operation and sale over time.
Although the Fifth Circuit did not indicate the amount of the capital gains tax
liability discount, it notably said, “the [Tax Court’s] misplaced emphasis on a
purchaser engaged in long-run timber production led to its peremptory denial of a
full discount for the accrued capital gains liability.”95 Later courts would view that
language as justifying a full discount for the tax liability.96
E. Dunn v. Commissioner
In an extension of its holding in Jameson, the Fifth Circuit in Dunn v.
Commissioner granted a taxpayer a full discount for the value of the capital gain tax
liability attributable to certain appreciated property owned by a closely held
business.97 The stock of that company formed a part of a decedent’s estate.98
The closely held business in this case was not a holding company; rather, its
principal business was the leasing of heavy equipment.99 At the time of the
decedent’s death, the business’s assets consisted primarily of equipment, some real
estate, and prepaid expenses and interest.100 The decedent owned about 63% of the
business’s outstanding stock, but that was not enough under Texas law to force a
liquidation of the company.101
The Fifth Circuit faced two issues in this appeal: (1) the amount of any builtin capital gains tax liability discount and (2) the weight to assign to different
measures of value—the earnings-based value for the operating portion of the
business and the asset-based value for the non-operating portion. The Tax Court
had allowed a 5% tax discount and a weighting of 35% to the earnings based value
and 65% to the asset based value.102 The Fifth Circuit disagreed with both
return from continued operation was 14%, while the expected return necessary for the hypothetical
buyer was 20%. Id. The Fifth Circuit called the Tax Court’s assumptions “internally inconsistent”
and “fatally flawed.” Id.
95

Id. (emphasis added).

96

See discussion infra Part II.E-F.

97

Dunn v. Commissioner, 301 F.3d 339, 351 (5th Cir. 2002).

98

Id. at 342.

99

Id. at 344.

100
101
102

Id.
Id. at 346 (noting that Texas law required at least a 2/3 vote to force a liquidation).
Estate of Dunn v. Comm’r, 79 T.C.M. (CCH) 1337, at 17, 33 (2000).
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conclusions. Of relevance to this article is the court’s analysis of the tax discount
issue.103
The Fifth Circuit found that the amount of potential gain if the equipment
and real estate were sold and the rate of tax (34%) was undisputed.104 The issue was
how to account for that tax liability in determining valuation. The taxpayer argued
for a full discount for the amount of the potential tax and the Service argued for no
discount because no sale was contemplated.105 As stated previously, the Tax Court
had reduced the discount to 5%, finding that a hypothetical buyer would not demand
a discount unless they contemplated a sale of the assets.106 The meager 5% discount
represented the unlikelihood of that possibility.107
The Fifth Circuit described the Tax Court’s analysis in this regard as “simply
wrong,”108 holding that a hypothetical buyer would demand a full discount for the tax
liability regardless of future intentions.109 The court stated:
We hold as a matter of law that the built-in gains tax liability of this
particular business’s assets must be considered as a dollar-for-dollar
reduction when calculating the asset-based value of the Corporation,
just as, conversely, built-in gains tax liability would have no place in
the calculation of the Corporation’s earnings-based value.110
The court found that the likelihood of liquidation did not enter the equation of the
amount of the discount, but rather only the allocation of weights between the

103 The Fifth Circuit revised the weight allocation to be 85% earnings based and 15% asset based.
Dunn, 301 F.3d at 358-59. The Tax Court’s determination of value also included discounts for lack of
marketability (15%) and lack of super-majority control (7.5%). These discounts were not contested
on appeal. Id. at 347.
104

Id. at 351.

105 Id. at 351-52. The IRS argued for no discount because “liquidation was not imminent or even
likely.” Id. at 352.
106

Dunn, 79 T.C.M (CCH) 1337, 32-33.

107

Id. at 33.

108

Dunn, 301 F.3d at 352.

109

Id.

110

Id. at 352-53.
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earnings and asset based valuation methods.111 For purposes of the asset-based
valuation, the appellate court unanimously held that the assumption of a sale was
automatic.112 In its conclusion of this aspect of its decision, the court reiterated that
“determination of the value of [the business] must include a reduction equal to 34%
of the taxable gain inherent in those assets as of the valuation date.”113 By this time
this case was decided, the Jelke case was already on the horizon.
III. THE JELKE DECISION
A. The Facts
The facts underlying Estate of Jelke v. Commissioner114 are summarized as
follows: Commercial Chemical Company (CCC), a closely held C corporation and
former operating company, had marketable securities as its only assets.115 The
decedent, Frazier Jelke, died on March 4, 1999, possessing a 6.44% interest in CCC
through a revocable trust.116 The total net asset value of CCC on the date of Jelke’s
death was approximately $188 million, and the total capital gain tax liability if the
securities had been sold on that date would have amounted to just over $51
million.117 On Jelke’s estate tax return, his interest in CCC was valued at $4.5 million,
which reflected a reduction in the net asset value for the full amount of the capital
gain tax liability, a 20% discount for lack of control, and a 35% discount for lack of
marketability.118 The IRS partially accepted the discounts for lack of control and
marketability, but issued a deficiency notice asserting that Jelke’s interest was actually
worth $9.1 million.119 The IRS reduced the full discount for the potential tax liability

Id. at 354. The court stated that the less likely a liquidation, the greater the weight to be given the
earnings-based value; the greater the likelihood, the greater the weight to be given the asset-based
calculation. Id.
111

112

Id. at 353 (describing the sale of the assets as a “foregone conclusion”).

113

Id. at 354.

114

Estate of Jelke v. Comm’r, 507 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 2007), cert.denied, 129 S. Ct. 168 (2008).

115

Estate of Jelke v. Comm’r, 89 T.C.M. (CCH) 1397 (2005), 2005 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 128, at *1.

116

Id.

117

Id.

118

Id. at *8.

119

Id. at *8-9.
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to the present value of asset sales conducted over a 16.8 year period.120 The estate
contested the deficiency in Tax Court in March of 2003.
B. The Tax Court Decision
Although there were issues in the Tax Court regarding the amount of
discounts for lack of control and marketability, the focus of this article and of the
Eleventh Circuit concerns the capital gains tax discount.121 The taxpayer argued that
Dunn,122 was apposite to this case and required a valuation based on liquidation at the
date of death with a consequent reduction in value for the full amount of the
projected tax.123 The taxpayer also argued that, due to CCC’s low dividend payout
rate, a buyer would opt for liquidation.124 The Tax Court disagreed, distinguishing
from Dunn on the grounds that Dunn was a nonbinding decision from another circuit
and that Dunn involved a majority interest (whereas Jelke’s interest was only
6.44%).125
Concerning valuation determination, the Tax Court agreed with the
Commissioner’s valuation expert.126 The Tax Court found that based on recent
history, the asset turnover rate of CCC averaged 5.95% per year, meaning it would
take 16.8 years for the entire portfolio to turn over.127 Dividing the total potential
capital gain tax of $51,626,884 by 16.8 resulted in an average capital gain tax of
$3,226,680 per year.128 Using a discount rate of 13.2%, this average was discounted

120

Id. at *25.

The Tax Court determined the appropriate discounts for control and marketability to be 10% and
15%, respectively. Id. at *45, *53. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed those amounts without discussion
in a footnote. Estate of Jelke v. Comm’r, 507 F.3d 1317, 1319 n.4 (11th Cir. 2007).

121

122

See discussion supra Part II.E.

123

Jelke, 89 T.C.M. (CCH) 1397, 2005 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 128, at *28-29.

124

Id.

Id. at *29-30 (holding that “neither the circumstances of this case nor the theory or method used to
value the minority interest in CCC requires an assumption of complete liquidation on the valuation
date”). The Court did not discuss why this factual difference in the cases mattered to the discount
issue. Id. In Dunn, the taxpayer’s lack of super-majority power was only relevant in determining the
amount of the control discount. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
125

126

Jelke, 89 T.C.M. (CCH) 1397, 2005 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 128, at *15.

127

Id. at *25.

128

Id. at *26.
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to a present value of approximately $21 million.129 That made Jelke’s share (before
control and marketability discounts) about $10.8 million.130 Jelke’s expert had
calculated this amount to be $8.8 million based on a full deduction of the $51 million
capital gains tax liability.131 After application of the control and marketability
discounts, the Tax Court held that Jelke’s interest should be valued at $8,254,696
rather than the estate’s claim of $4,588,155.132 The taxpayer appealed.
C. The Eleventh Circuit Decision133
The Jelke appellate court decision is particularly helpful because the value and
basis of all the assets of CCC were clear, known, and agreed upon.134 Also, the
appellate court accepted, without discussion, the lack of control and lack of
marketability discounts.135 Therefore, the only issue addressed by the Eleventh
Circuit involved the handling of the discount for the hypothetical capital gains tax.136
In a 2-1 decision, the court reversed the decision of the Tax Court.137
After thoroughly reviewing the history of applicable case law beginning with
General Utilities,138 the majority applied the existing case law to the Jelke facts139.
Estate tax valuation was described as being based on the “arbitrary assumption that a
liquidation takes place on the date of death.”140 On this date, a “snap shot” of value
129

Id.

130

Id.

Id. at *24. The estate’s expert and the Commissioner’s expert agreed that the date-of-death value
of the marketable securities was $188,635,833. Id. at *25. The estate’s expert then deducted the full
hypothetical capital gains tax amount of $51,626,884 and multiplied the result by Jelke’s 6.44%
interest to arrive at $8,823,062 (before control and marketability discounts). Id. at *24-25.
131

132 Id. at *53. The estate had argued for control and marketability discounts of 25 and 35 percent,
respectively, but the Tax Court settled at 10 and 15 percent. Id. at *36.
133

Estate of Jelke v. Comm’r, 507 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 2007), cert.denied, 129 S. Ct. 168 (2008).

134

Id. at 1318 n.3. The assets involved in Jelke were all marketable securities. Id.

135

Id. at 1319 n.4.

136

Id. at 1321.

Citing its recent decision in Estate of Blount v. Commissioner, 428 F.3d 1338, 1346 (11th Cir. 2005), the
Jelke appellate court stated that the notion of a hypothetical buyer ignoring the built-in gains tax
liability “strains credulity and defies any sensible construct of fair market value.” Id. at 1331.

137

138

Id. at 1322-33.

139

Id. at 1334.

140

Id. at 1331.
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is taken.141 Without a great deal of discussion, the Eleventh Circuit majority adopted
the Dunn approach142 as consistent with the notion of a “snap shot” and presumed
liquidation as of the date of death.143 The court held that this method avoided the
uncertainty and speculation of other methods that sought to project sales into the
future and then discounted them back to the present value.144
The majority conceded that its approach contained an element of
arbitrariness.145 However, the court found that any method other than a full
discount for the capital gains tax lacked certainty and engaged in the kind of
speculation opposed by the IRS.146 The court held that Dunn “eliminates the crystal
ball and the coin flip and provides certainty and finality to valuation as best it can,
already a vague and shadowy undertaking.”147
The court’s adherence to Dunn resulted in acceptance of the $51 million
discount argued by the taxpayer.148 The Commissioner filed a petition for certiorari
with the United States Supreme Court on June 19, 2008.149 It was denied four
months later.150
141

Id.

142

See discussion supra Part II.E (discussing the Dunn approach).

143

Id. at 1332.

144

Id.

Id. at 1331. However, the court noted that a hypothetical buyer would logically demand the full
discount because they could otherwise purchase the same mix of investments in the market that CCC
possessed without incurring the tax risk. Id.

145

146 Id. at 1332 (noting that utilizing the Tax Court’s methodology “could cause the Commissioner to
revive his ‘too speculative a tax’ contentions made prior to the Estate of Davis in 1998”).
147

Id. at 1332-33.

148

Id. at 1333.

149 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Comm’r v. Estate of Jelke, 129 S. Ct. 168 (2008) (No. 07-1582),
2008 WL 2472932. The questions presented by the writ were as follows:

1. Whether the fair market value of property for purposes of the federal
estate tax, including selection of an appropriate valuation methodology, is a
question of fact, reviewed for clear error.
2. Whether the court of appeals erred in holding, as a matter of law, that
whenever a company’s fair market value for estate tax purposes is determined
based on its net asset value, there must be a dollar-for-dollar discount for any builtin gains tax liability based on the arbitrary assumption that the company was
liquidated on the valuation date.
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D. The Jelke Dissent
Judge Carnes dissented from the majority holding, arguing that his colleagues
had opted for the easier but less accurate valuation determination.151 He urged
upholding the Tax Court decision as one resulting in a value closer to “real.”152
Judge Carnes found it highly unlikely that a prospective buyer would contemplate
liquidating a company that had an average annual return of 23% and sizable
unrealized capital gains.153 Rather, he thought the Tax Court view that CCC would
continue its turnover rate at about 6% per year was more reasonable and likely.154
According to the dissent, although a prospective buyer would demand some
discount for the prospective capital gains, such a buyer could not reasonably expect a
full discount because no seller would provide it.155
Further, Judge Carnes argued, if the methodology of the majority was sound,
it should be applied in other contexts, such as the computation of damage awards in
tort cases.156 Otherwise, he said—mocking the majority opinion with its own
words—courts are engaging in “prophesying,” “hunt-and-peck forecasting,”
“flipping a coin,” or “gazing into a crystal ball.”157 Judge Carnes also accused the
majority of succumbing to “ignoble ease” and “seductive simplicity” at the cost of
greater accuracy and realism.158 According to the dissent, the simplicity trumpeted by
the majority came at the price of arbitrariness.159 Based on its more sophisticated—

Id. at *I.
150

Comm’r v. Estate of Jelke, 129 S. Ct. 168 (2008).

151

Jelke, 507 F.3d at 1334 (Carnes, J., dissenting).

152

Id. at 1335.

Id. at 1336 (referring to the notion of a prospective buyer liquidating the company’s assets as
“preposterous”).
153

154

Id.

155

Id.

156

Id. at 1337.

157

Id. at 1338.

158

Id. at 1337.

Id. at 1339. As previously discussed, the majority conceded as much although they contended that
the benefits of certainty, simplicity, clarity, consistency, and finality outweighed the apparent
arbitrariness of their methodology. Id. at 1333 (majority opinion).
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and in Carnes’s view, more rational—approach, the dissent argued that the decision
of the Tax Court should have been affirmed.160
IV. ANALYSIS
The Code and Regulations indicate that valuation of assets for estate tax
purposes should be made at the time of death (unless alternate valuation is elected)161
and that the fair market value of closely held stock should be based on what a
hypothetical buyer and seller would agree upon as a price.162 This mandate creates
the issue that is the subject of this article. While it is quite sensible that the estate tax
value is determined as of the date of death (or gift tax value be determined as of the
date of the gift) and that the value be a “fair market value,” it is less clear, but
certainly defensible, that fair market value should be derived from a “hypothetical”
buyer and seller. Several courts have distinguished the hypothetical buyer and seller
from “actual” or “strategic” ones, and that distinction has led to different
outcomes.163 Furthermore, the Regulations do not specifically define how a
hypothetical buyer or seller behaves. The Regulations do say that both should be
considered knowledgeable with respect to the transaction involved, and the
transaction is to be considered voluntary.164 That is the extent of the guidance
provided by the Regulations.

160

Id. at 1340 (Carnes, J., dissenting).

161

I.R.C. § 2032(a)(1)-(2) (2006).

162

Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b) (as amended in 1965).

Jelke, 507 F.3d at 1331 (“We are dealing with hypothetical, not strategic, willing buyers and willing
sellers.”); Jameson v. Comm’r, 267 F.3d 366, 372 (5th Cir. 2001) (“The hypothetical willing
buyer/willing seller test substitutes evidence of the actual owner’s or purchaser’s intent with the most
economically rational analysis of the sale.”); Eisenberg v. Comm’r, 155 F.3d 50, 57 (2nd Cir. 1998);
Estate of Bright v. Comm’r, 658 F.2d 999, 1006 (5th Cir. 1984); Estate of Andrews v. Comm’r, 79
T.C. 938, 956 (1982) (“[T]he case law and regulations require a truly hypothetical willing seller and
willing buyer. We must assume these hypothetical parties exist even though the reality of the situation
may be that the stock will most probably be sold to a particular party or type of person.”); LeFrak v.
Comm’r, 66 T.C.M. (CCH) 1297 (1993), 1993 WL 470956, at *3 (“The standard is an objective test
using hypothetical buyers and sellers in the marketplace, and is not a personalized one which
envisions a particular buyer and seller.”).
163

164 Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b) (as amended in 1965) (“[N]either being under any compulsion to buy or
to sell and both having a reasonable knowledge of relevant facts.”); Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-3 (as
amended in 1992) (containing the same language).
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Determining the value of closely-held stock is, in the best of circumstances,
an elusive task for any court.165 When courts deviate from a valuation methodology
that assumes a date-of-death liquidation and a fully discountable capital gains tax,
they are heading into speculative territory. If a court presumes sales over time as the
Tax Court did in Jelke, a number of variables become speculative, such as a turnover
rate that is the same as the average turnover over the preceding “X” number of
years, a turnover rate that is constant over a multi-year period despite the likely ups
and downs of the market, a constant capital gains tax rate, future asset values which
may be significantly higher or lower than actual, a presumed rate of return, a
constant mix of investments over a multi-year period, and a continued corporate
existence until the turnover reaches 100%.
Assumptions concerning these variables are more subjective and prone to
error than a methodology that simply assumes liquidation at the date of death and
computes and discounts for the amount of tax on any gains that would result. The
latter methodology is clear and certain but admittedly rather arbitrary. Furthermore,
the virtues of certainty, clarity, consistency, simplicity, and finality should not be
denigrated. If there was a clearly more accurate and less arbitrary valuation
methodology that required greater complexity and sophistication, of course that
methodology should triumph in the pursuit of that discernable accuracy. That,
however, is not the case.
The Jelke Tax Court and dissenting Court of Appeals Judge Carnes believed
that the greater complexity and sophistication they advocated resulted in a more
accurate valuation. That is a mistaken belief: It may be more accurate, but it also
may not.166 Absent the crystal ball Judge Carnes mocked or the revelations of time,
no one can know which valuation (the Tax Court’s or the Eleventh Circuit’s) is more
accurate. Either or both may be wildly or only slightly inaccurate. Since the
165 See Stephen J. Leacock, The Anatomy of Valuing Stock in Closely Held Corporations: Pursuing the Phantom
of Objectivity into the New Millennium, 2001 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 161, 162-63 (2001).

As stated by the Fifth Circuit in Dunn (requiring a dollar-for-dollar reduction for the built-in capital
gains tax):

166

[V]aluing businesses, particularly closely held corporations, is not pure science
replete with precise formulae and susceptible of mathematical calculation but
instead depends largely on subjective opinions . . . [and] necessarily contain some
vagaries, ambiguities, inexactitudes, caveats, and qualifications . . . the methodology
we employ today may be viewed by some . . . as unsophisticated, dogmatic, overly
simplistic, or just plain wrong . . . . In this regard, we observe that the end of the
methodology spectrum opposite oversimplification lies over-engineering.
Estate of Dunn v. Comm’r, 301 F.3d 339, 358 n.36 (5th Cir. 2002).
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Regulations require the use of hypothetical buyers and sellers and since any method
utilized may significantly under- or over-value closely held stock, it seems reasonable
and prudent to presume liquidation as of the date of death, compute the capital gains
tax at known current rates, and deduct the full amount of the tax from the
liquidation amount. From there, discounts for lack of control and lack of
marketability can be employed (two other decidedly imprecise measures).167 As
Revenue Ruling 59-60 indicated, the determination of the value of a closely held
business is more art than science, and we must tolerate the reality that art is not
subject to precise measurement.168 It is indeed unfortunate that the Supreme Court
167The Internal Revenue Service defines a marketability discount as “[a]n amount or percentage
deducted from an equity interest to reflect a lack of marketability” and a minority discount as “[t]he
reduction, from the pro rata share of the value of the entire business, to reflect the absence of power
or control.” Glossary, IRS Valuation Guide for Income, Estate and Gift Taxes: Valuation Training
for Appeals Officers (1997). The IRS Valuation Guide also says, “. . . Courts have allowed discounts
ranging from 10 percent to 65 percent for marketability and minority interest.” Id. at 99. See also
Leacock, supra note 165, at 196-200.

Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 C.B. 237 (stating that “valuation is not an exact science”). Regarding
securities, the Ruling states: “Valuation of securities is, in essence, a prophecy as to the future and
must be based on facts available at the required date of appraisal.” Id. at § 3.03. Allowing a full
discount for the tax on built-in gains would also arguably be more consistent with the Ruling’s
injunction to be “based on facts available at the required date” rather than other methodologies which
hypothesize discount rates and assume constants that, in fact, will change over time. Id. The
Eleventh Circuit stated in Jelke:
168

Cases prior to the Estate of Dunn, prophesying as to when the assets will be
sold and reducing the tax liability to present value, depending upon the length of
time discerned by the court over which these taxes shall be paid, require a crystal ball.
The longer the time, the lower the discount. The shorter the time, the higher the
discount.
The downside of this approach is that, not only is it fluidly ethereal, it
requires a type of hunt-and-peck forecasting by the courts. In reality, this method could
cause the Commissioner to revive his “too speculative a tax” contentions made
prior to the Estate of Davis in 1998. This methodology requires us to either gaze into
a crystal ball, flip a coin, or, at the very least, split the difference between the present
value calculation projections of the taxpayers on the one hand, and the present
value calculation projections of the Commissioner, on the other.
We think the approach set forth by the Fifth Circuit in the Estate of Dunn
is the better of the two. The estate tax owed is calculated based upon a “snap shot
of valuation” frozen on the date of Jelke’s death, taking into account only those facts
known on that date. It is more logical and appropriate to value the shares of CCC
stock on the date of death based upon an assumption that a liquidation has
occurred, without resort to present values or prophesies.
The rationale of the Fifth Circuit in the Estate of Dunn eliminates the crystal
ball and the coin flip and provides certainty and finality to valuation as best it can,
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declined to hear the Jelke case because it could have provided a methodology that
would result in consistency of application and greater uniformity of results in the
valuation of closely held stock for estate and gift tax purposes.
V. CONCLUSION
The Jelke case provided the United States Supreme Court an opportunity to
clarify the law concerning the appropriate discount for capital gains taxes in the
valuation of closely held stock for estate and gift tax purposes. Jelke was a “clean”
case in that the overall value of the corporate assets was known and agreed upon by
all parties.169 Further, there was no dispute about the amount of the discounts for
lack of control or marketability.170 The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have explicitly
held that the full amount of the tax should be used in calculating the discount.171
The Second and Sixth Circuits, however, have implied (but not definitively held) that
something less than the full amount is more appropriate.172 Jelke provided a ripe
opportunity for the Supreme Court to rule on the issue, but the Supreme Court
declined to do so for the time being. Cases concerning this topic will continue to
percolate in the lower courts because the issue is significant and the amounts in
controversy are often in the millions of dollars. The sooner the Supreme Court acts,
the sooner this aspect of the valuation conundrum can be settled, and taxpayers and
the Service can have clarity with regard to at least one component of this “vague and
shadowy undertaking.”173

already a vague and shadowy undertaking. It is a welcome road map for those in
the judiciary, not formally trained in the art of valuation.
Jelke, 507 F.3d at 1332-33 (emphasis added).
169

Jelke, 507 F.3d at 1318 n.3.

170

Id. at 1319 n.4.

171

Id. at 1317; Estate of Dunn v. Comm’r, 301 F.3d 339 (5th Cir. 2002).

Estate of Welch v. Comm’r, No. 98-2007, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 3315 (6th Cir. Mar. 1, 2000);
Eisenberg v. Comm’r, 155 F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 1998).
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173

Jelke, 507 F.3d at 1333.

